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Abstract
Taking into account non-constant marginal costs, this paper con-
siders the effects of a tariff cut combined with a consumption tax in-
crease on welfare, government revenue, and market access. We show
that welfare, government revenue, and market access can all improve
with this policy reform under decreasing marginal costs. This result
may provide a theoretical rationale for the above policy reform, which
is guided by the IMF and the World Bank.
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1 Introduction
A tariff reduction is one of the most important driving forces behind rapid
growth of world trade. In an influential work, Baier and Bergstrand (2001,
p. 22) report evidence suggesting that ‘tariff reductions still explain almost
three times as much trade growth as transport-cost declines.’ As the tradi-
tional trade theory claims, growth of world trade is potentially gainful for
not only an individual country but also the world. Nevertheless, a num-
ber of developing countries have a concern over trade liberalization for fear
that it induces government revenue losses. In order to compensate for them,
several countries have introduced another tax, e.g., a consumption tax or
a value-added tax (VAT).1 However, Baunsgaard and Keen (2010, p. 571)
empirically find that ‘for low income countries, implying no impact on the
extent of revenue recovery.’
Given these growing interests in the empirical literature, there is a the-
oretical literature that examines the effects of tariff-tax reforms. While this
paper is along this line of research, we focus on one specific tariff-tax reform,
which is increasingly recognized in the literature, in a context of imperfect
competition. The policy reform we study consists of one unit of tariff re-
duction and the same unit of consumption tax increase. This policy reform,
which is first addressed by Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), is welfare-improving
for a competitive small open economy. Keen and Ligthart (2002) general-
ize this result, but the same authors (Keen and Ligthart (2005)) show that
the same no longer survives imperfect competition. Concretely, assuming a
duopoly served by a domestic and a foreign duopolists, and linear demand
and marginal costs, Keen and Ligthart (2005) demonstrate that the point-
by-point reform necessarily reduces welfare.
The finding of Keen and Ligthart (2005) is striking, but it deserves fur-
ther investigations since it rests on many simplifying assumptions.2 This
paper revisits their result by paying special attention to the role of non-
constant marginal costs. As is first illustrated by Krugman (1984), non-
constant marginal costs allow a policy change to have a secondary (spillover)
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effect through a change in each firm’s marginal cost. We show that the point-
by-point policy reform can improve welfare under decreasing marginal cost
whereas Keen and Ligthart’s (2005) result is valid under increasing marginal
costs.
Another purpose of this paper is to look at the effect of the tariff-tax
reform on market access, which is defined by a value of import volumes at
the world price. The reason for considering the market access effect is that
market access issues have an increasing importance in the real world. In a
model of a competitive small open economy, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-
Møller (2008) prove that the point-by-point policy reform may fail to increase
market access although it does raise welfare and government revenue. To our
knowledge, there is no previous work that addresses the market access aspect
of the tariff-tax reform under imperfect competition. This paper fulfills this
gap.
Apart from the tariff-tax literature, there is another strand of literature
on trade policies that incorporates non-constant marginal costs. Although
the assumption of constant marginal cost is analytically convenient and fre-
quently made in literature, it is not surprisingly natural that marginal costs
are non-constant. For example, in many manufacturing industries, decreasing
marginal costs through R&D, learning-by-doing and developments of commu-
nication networks are profoundly observed.3 In this sense, it is an important
task to explore whether the policy outcomes under the assumption of con-
stant marginal cost are survives the more realistic assumption of non-constant
marginal costs. To our knowledge, Krugman (1984) is the first to seek this
objective in the trade policy literature. While Krugman’s (1984) argument
is mainly based on a diagrammatic approach, Uekawa (1994) examines wel-
fare effects of multiple trade policies with a rigorously mathematical model.
Developing a formal model, Zhang and Zhang (1998) mathematically for-
malize Krugman’s (1984) argument. In a monopoly model, Ishikawa (2004),
Ishikawa and Kuroda (2007), and Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2008a, 2008b)
also demonstrate that the effects of trade policies including trade liberaliza-
3
tion crucially depend on whether marginal costs are increasing, constant, or
decreasing, as well as demand behavior.
This paper is planned as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section 3
seeks welfare effects of the point-by-point tariff-tax reform suggested above,
and Section 4 turns to its effects on government revenue and market ac-
cess. Section 5 concludes. Appendix presents the detailed derivation of key
equations in the main text.
2 A Model
Consider a market of a country, say Home, in which a Home firm and a
Foreign firm play a Cournot-Nash game. Denoting by p(x + y) the inverse
demand function of the Home consumer, where x and y are the output of
the Home and Foreign firms, respectively, and p(·) is strictly decreasing, i.e.,
p′(·) < 0. Both firms have a production cost c(x) and c∗(y), the marginal
cost of which is either increasing, constant, or decreasing.4
The government levies a specific import tariff t ≥ 0 and a consumption
tax τ ≥ 0.5 Given these assumptions, the profit of each firm is defined by
Home firm : p(x+ y)x− c(x)− τx
Foreign firm : p(x+ y)y − c∗(y)− τy − ty,
by noting that the world market price of the duopolized good is p − τ − t
since p is the price at which the Home consumer purchases, i.e., it is the
world price plus the consumption tax and tariff.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are determined by the system of
the first-order conditions for profit maximization:
xp′(x+ y) + p(x+ y)− c′(x)− τ = 0 (1)
yp′(x+ y) + p(x+ y)− c′∗(y)− τ − t = 0, (2)
and the second-order conditions:6
xp′′ + 2p′ − c′′(x) < 0, yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y) < 0.
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Totally differentiating (1) and (2), we have[
xp′′ + 2p′ − c′′(x) xp′′ + p′
yp′′ + p′ yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)
] [
dx
dy
]
=
[
1
1
]
dτ +
[
0
1
]
dt,
from which the comparative static outcomes are7
∂x
∂τ
=
−(x− y)p′′ + p′ − c′′∗(y)
∆
,
∂y
∂τ
=
(x− y)p′′ + p′ − c′′(x)
∆
(3)
∂x
∂t
=
−(xp′′ + p′)
∆
,
∂y
∂t
=
xp′′ + 2p′ − c′′(x)
∆
, (4)
where ∆ is the determinant of the coefficient matrix:
∆ = [xp′′ + 2p′ − c′′(x)] [yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)]− (xp′′ + p′)(yp′′ + p′),
which is assumed to be positive from the stability of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.8
3 Welfare Effects
Welfare of the Home country W consists of consumer surplus CS, the Home
firm’s profit pi, consumption tax revenue, and tariff revenue:
W (τ, t) = CS + pi + consumption tax revenue + tariff revenue, (5)
where
CS =
∫ x+y
0
p(X)dX − (x+ y)p(x+ y) (6)
pi = p(x+ y)x− c(x)− τx (7)
consumption tax revenue = τ(x+ y) (8)
tariff revenue = ty, (9)
and x and y are the function of τ and t from (1) and (2). Using (6)-(9) and
differentiating (5) with respect to τ and t, we obtain
∂W (τ, t)
∂τ
= y + [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ] ∂x
∂τ
+ (−yp′ + τ + t) ∂y
∂τ
(10)
∂W (τ, t)
∂t
= y + [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ] ∂x
∂t
+ (−yp′ + τ + t) ∂y
∂t
. (11)
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The policy reform suggested by Keen and Ligthart (2005) is defined by
dτ = −dt > 0, namely one unit of tariff reduction is accompanied by one unit
of consumption tax increase. Its welfare effect is calculated by subtracting
(11) from (10):9
∂W (τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂W (τ, t)
∂t
=
−c′′∗(y) [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ]− y (xp′ + t) p′′ + [−(x+ y)p′ + p− c′(x)− t] p′
∆
.
(12)
Eq. (12) allows us to find that the sign of ∂W/∂τ − ∂W/∂t crucially de-
pends on that of the Foreign firm’s marginal cost. Formally, we can establish:
Proposition 1. The welfare effects of the point-by-point tariff-tax reform
are summarized as:
(1) If demand is linear and c′′∗(y) ≥ 0, it reduces welfare.
(2) If c′(x) = c′∗(y) and both firms’ marginal cost is non-decreasing, it reduces
welfare.
(3) If demand is linear and c′′∗(y) < 0, it can improve welfare.
Proof. See Appendix. ||
(Figures 1 and 2 around here)
Let us seek intuitions behind Proposition 1 by the help of Figures 1 and
2. Suppose that the pre-reform Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by N in
the figures. One unit of tariff reduction accompanied with the same unit of
consumption tax increase shifts only the Home firm’s reaction curve inward
to the dotted locus without affecting the Foreign firm’s reaction curve. As
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a result, the Home firm’s output decreases, and the Foreign firm’s output
increases. As Keen and Ligthart (2005) argue, this profit-shifting into the
Foreign country is the key for their result that this policy reform reduces
welfare.
In contrast, the same is no longer the case under non-constant marginal
costs since a change in outputs has a secondary effect on the reaction curves
through a change in marginal costs. Under increasing marginal costs, a
decrease in the Home firm’s output lowers its marginal cost, and the opposite
holds for the Foreign firm. Therefore, the Home firm’s reaction curve shifts
outward to the dashed locus while the Foreign firm’s reaction curve shrinks.
Hence, the post-reform Cournot-Nash equilibrium becomes N ′ at which the
profit-shifting effect is partially offset since N ′′ would be the new equilibrium
where marginal costs were constant. The Home firm’s output expansion that
occurs as a secondary effect raises its cost and hence price, which is another
reason for a welfare loss. To sum, under increasing marginal costs, welfare is
likely to deteriorate than the constant marginal costs case.
On the other hand, the first effect on outputs shifts the Home firm’s
reaction curve inward further, and the Foreign firm’s reaction curve outward
further (see Figure 2). At the resulting equilibrium N ′, the profit-shifting is
larger than the constant marginal costs case. Nevertheless, it is possible for
welfare to improve because it allows both the marginal cost of the Foreign firm
and the price to fall, which benefits the Home consumer. Consequently, there
is a possibility of a welfare improvement in the case of decreasing marginal
costs.
Remark 1. Simple examples may make sense for Proposition 1. The most
frequently adopted example of increasing marginal costs is a quadratic cost
function c(x) = cx2/2 and c(y) = cy2/2, where c is a positive constant. Then,
if c is large enough, the above policy reform proves to welfare-reducing.
An example exhibiting decreasing marginal costs is c(x) = 1− exp(−bx)
and c(y) = 1 − exp(−by), where b is a positive constant, and measures the
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concavity (the degree of decreasing marginal cost). With sufficiently high b,
the policy reform can be gainful.10
Remark 2. While the foregoing arguments focus on the Home welfare, we
briefly address the effect on Foreign welfare, which is measured by the profit
of the Foreign firm. Letting pi∗(τ, t) denote the Foreign firm’s profit in the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the tariff-tax reform we are considering affects
pi∗(τ, t) as follows.
∂pi∗(τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂pi
∗(τ, t)
∂t
= [yp′ + p− c′∗(y)− τ − t]
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
+
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
yp′
=
[yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)]yp′
∆
> 0,
where the second equation uses the first-order condition for the Foreign firm’s
profit maximization (2), and the comparative statics results (3) and (4). The
positivity follows from the second-order condition for profit-maximization
yp′′+ 2p′− c′′∗(y) < 0. Consequently, Foreign will agree to the point-by-point
tariff-tax reform suggested in the sense that the reform improves the Foreign
welfare irrespective of the sign of c′′∗(y).
4 Effects on Government Revenue and Mar-
ket Access
While the last section has focused on the welfare effect of the policy reform,
this section turns to the other effects of it. Throughout this section, we exclu-
sively focus on the linear demand case. The first is the effect on government
revenue, and the second is the effect on market access.
4.1 Government Revenue Effect
The government revenue T is the sum of the consumption tax revenue and
the tariff revenue, and given by
T (τ, t) ≡ τ(x+ y) + ty.
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A change in the consumption tax and tariff is
∂T (τ, t)
∂τ
= x+ y + τ
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
+ t
∂y
∂τ
∂T (τ, t)
∂t
= y + τ
∂(x+ y)
∂t
+ t
∂y
∂t
.
Thus, the effect of one unit of tariff reduction accompanied by one unit
consumption tax increase is11
∂T (τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂T (τ, t)
∂t
= x+
−τc′′∗(y) + (τ − t)p′
∆
. (13)
While the sign of (13) is generally ambiguous, Eq. (13) has an important
implication, which is:
Proposition 2. Suppose τ < t. Then, under either constant or decreas-
ing marginal costs, the point-by-point policy reform increases the government
revenue. If, on the other hand, marginal costs are sufficiently strongly in-
creasing, the government revenue can decrease.12
Proof. Straightforward from (13). ||
The ambiguous result on the government revenue effect is parallel with
the finding of Keen and Ligthart (2005). However, what is worth noting is
that the positive effect is more likely under decreasing marginal costs than
constant marginal costs. This is because a large increase in the Foreign firm’s
output favorably affects both the consumption tax revenue and tariff revenue.
From the opposite reason, the government can lose from the reform under
increasing marginal costs since the output expansion of the Foreign firm is
mitigated as compared to the constant marginal costs case (see Figure 1 once
again).
4.2 Market Access Effect
The last effect we are interested in is the market access effect. As is in-
troduced in Introduction, this criterion of policy reform has an increasing
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importance, but it is not addressed in a context of imperfect competition.
This subsection fulfills this gap by using the present generalized model of
Keen and Ligthart (2005). Following Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller
(2008, p. 87), we define the market access M as ‘the value of imports at the
world market prices.’
M(τ, t) ≡ [p(x+ y)− τ − t]y.
Then, a change in τ and t affects M as follows.
∂M(τ, t)
∂τ
=
[
p′
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
− 1
]
y + (p− τ − t)∂y
∂τ
∂M(τ, t)
∂t
=
[
p′
∂(x+ y)
∂t
− 1
]
y + (p− τ − t)∂y
∂t
.
Subtracting the latter from the former, and substituting (3) and (4) into
the resulting expression, we have13
∂M(τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂M(τ, t)
∂t
=
{y[2p′ − c′′∗(y)]− c′∗(y)} p′
∆
, (14)
which is definitely positive. Therefore, we have arrived at:
Proposition 3. The point-by-point policy reform necessarily improves mar-
ket access whether marginal costs are constant or non-constant.
Proposition 3 gives a good feature of the suggested policy reform. Kre-
ickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) prove that the same policy reform
does not necessarily improve market access in a competitive small open econ-
omy whereas it is welfare- and revenue-improving.14 In contrast, Proposition
3 suggests that the above skepticism no longer survives imperfect competi-
tion. In this sense, Proposition 3 has a certain importance in considering the
market access effect of the reform.
One of the most important implications obtained in our analysis is that
the point-by-point policy reform is not only easy to implement but also it can
involve a win-win-win outcome, i.e., it can enhance all of welfare, government
revenue, and market access particularly under decreasing marginal costs.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Incorporating non-constant marginal costs into a model of Keen and Ligthart
(2005), we have examined the effect of a tariff cut combined with a consump-
tion tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. It is
shown that all of these can improve as a result of the suggested policy reform
under decreasing marginal costs.
Despite the above novelty, our analysis needs more elaboration. For in-
stance, we have considered no inherent dynamic interaction between marginal
costs and outputs by simply assuming decreasing marginal costs which are
called static economies of scale. Alternatively, it is possible to build a dy-
namic game model of economies of scale as in Spence (1981). It is our future
research agenda to reconsider the robustness of our result in a richer setting.
Appendix
Derivation of (12) and Proof of Proposition 1
Subtracting (10) from (11), we have
∂W (τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂W (τ, t)
∂t
= [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ]
(
∂x
∂τ
− ∂x
∂t
)
+ (−yp′ + τ + t)
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
.
Substituting (3) and (4) into this yields
∂W (τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂W (τ, t)
∂t
=
−c′′∗(y) [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ]− y (xp′ + t) p′′ + [−(2x+ y)p′ + τ − t] p′
∆
=
−c′′∗(y) [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ]− y (xp′ + t) p′′ + [−(x+ y)p′ + p− c′(x)− t] p′
∆
,
where the last equation uses the first-order condition for the Home firm’s
profit maximization (1).
Making use of (12), statements (1) and (3) in Proposition 1 straight-
forwardly follow since the numerator of (12) with linear demand (p′′ = 0)
becomes −c′′∗(y) [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ] + [−(x+ y)p′ + p− c′(x)− t] p′ < 0 when
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c′′∗(y) ≥ 0, and can be positive when the degree of c′′∗(y) < 0 is sufficiently
strong.
To prove statement (2), let us set c′(x) = c′∗(y). Then, the numerator of
(12) is rewritten as
−c′′∗(y) [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ]− y (xp′ + t) p′′ + [−(x+ y)p′ + p− c′(x)− t] p′
= [−(x+ y)p′ + τ ] [yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)]− (−yp′ + τ + t) (yp′′ + p′)
= [−(x+ y)p′ + xp′ + p− c′(x)] [yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)]− [−yp′ + yp′ + p− c′∗(y)] (yp′′ + p′)
= [p− c′(x)− yp′] [yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)]− [p− c′(x)] (yp′′ + p′)
= −y [yp′′ + 2p′ − c′′∗(y)] p′ + [p− c′(x)] [p′ − c′′∗(y)] ,
where the second line eliminates τ and t from the two first-order conditions
(1) and (2), and the third line uses c′(x) = c′∗(y). Taking into account
the second-order condition for the Foreign firm’s profit maximization, and
c′′∗(y) ≥ 0, the above equation becomes negative, and hence we have arrived
at statement (2).
Derivation of (13)
The effect of the reform on government revenue is
∂T (τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂T (τ, t)
∂t
= x+ τ
[
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
− ∂(x+ y)
∂t
]
+ t
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
= x+ τ
p′ − c′′∗(y)
∆
+ t
−yp′′ − p′
∆
= x+
τ [p′ − c′′∗(y)]− tp′
∆
= x+
−τc′′∗(y) + (τ − t)p′
∆
,
where the second equation uses (3) and (4), and the third equation follows
from the assumption of linear demand.
Derivation of (14)
The effect of the reform on market access is
∂M(τ, t)
∂τ
− ∂M(τ, t)
∂t
12
= yp′
[
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
− ∂(x+ y)
∂t
]
+ (p− τ − t)
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂y
∂t
)
= yp′
p′ − c′′∗(y)
∆
+ (p− τ − t)−yp
′′ − p′
∆
=
yp′[p′ − c′′∗(y)]− (p− τ − t)p′
∆
(15)
=
{y[p′ − c′′∗(y)]− [p− yp′ − p+ c′∗(y)]} p′
∆
(16)
=
{y[2p′ − c′′∗(y)]− c′∗(y)} p′
∆
> 0,
where Eq. (15) comes from linear demand, and Eq. (16) uses (2), i.e.,
τ + t = yp′ + p− c′∗(y). The positivity of (14) follows from the second-order
condition for the Foreign firm’s profit maximization, 2p′ − c′′∗(y) < 0.
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Notes
1. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) provide an empirical assessment of the
effect of the change in tax base on government revenue.
2. To our knowledge, Naito and Abe (2008) are the only previous work that
revisits Keen and Ligthart’s (2005) result by using a vertically related model
of imperfect competition.
3. Dick (1994), Yan et al. (2008) and Thompson (2010) are an example of
an empirical study of R&D and learning-by-doing.
4. While it is interesting to allow for the case where one firm’s marginal
cost is non-constant, and the other firm’s marginal cost is constant, such a
possibility complicates the analysis so drastically that we assume away it.
Okuguchi and Serizawa (1996) address the above possibility in a context of
15
strategic trade policies.
5. This paper assumes specific taxes because (i) we want to make the model
as close to Keen and Ligthart’s (2005) as possible, and (ii) ad valorem taxes
make the analysis too complicated to obtain definite results.
6. In what follows, we employ simpler notations p′ and p′′ to denote p′(x+y)
and p′′(x+ y).
7. Throughout this paper, it is presupposed that both firms are active in
equilibrium.
8. For the details of stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, see Zhang
and Zhang (1998).
9. The detailed derivation of this equation is left in Appendix.
10. Of course, b can not be too large due to the second-order condition for
profit maximization. Although it is possible to make a parallel example of a
linearly decreasing marginal cost c(x) = ex− fx2/2 and c(y) = ey − fy2/2,
where e and f are both positive, this example can not ensure a welfare
improvement.
11. The derivation of (13) is left in Appendix.
12. The assumption that τ < t is empirically plausible and applicable to
many countries, particularly developing countries.
13. Eq. (14) is derived in details in Appendix.
14. See also Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) for
the effects on welfare and government revenue.
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Figure 1: The effect of the policy reform: increasing marginal costs
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Figure 2: The effect of the policy reform: decreasing marginal costs
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